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A B S T R A C T 
This paper proposes a mathematical model to plan the financial strategy of a large com-
pany. The model links the philosophy of new behavioural economics with the multiple cri-
teria decision making paradigm. Within this theoretical approach, the proposed model is 
supported by more realistic behavioral hypotheses. After formulating the initial multi-
objective programming model, it has, due to its underlying computational difficulties, to 
be transformed into an easily computable extended compromise programming model. 
The functional and empirical potential of the model is illustrated with the help of a case 
study concerning a "stock market quoted" Spanish company operating in the energy sector. 
This paper shows how such an approach can open up new prospects for research linking 
economic problems with applied mathematics. 
1. Introduction 
Company profit maximization was one of the basic hypotheses of the neoclassical theory of production (Ref. [1]). In 
the second half of the 20th century, however, several economists challenged this hypothesis from different viewpoints. 
Baumol (Refs. [2,3]) was perhaps the first to call into question the classic "maximum profits" hypothesis, offering an 
alternative hypothesis valid for large companies (especially within an oligopolistic structure). This hypothesis, known 
as the "profit constrained-revenue maximization hypothesis", postulates that the behavior of certain big companies is ex-
plained by the maximization of a sales revenue objective function subject to a minimum profit constraint assuring that a 
"satisfactory" dividend is distributed among company stockholders. Consequently, the firm managers owe a fiduciary 
responsibility to the shareholders, since company investors are interested primarily in receiving as high return as 
possible. 
Baumol's hypothesis was extended by other researchers and received sizeable empirical support (see, e.g. [4,5]). 
Despite this empirical support, interest in such company management theories based upon alternative premises to the 
classic maximization hypothesis has fallen off in the last decades. Possible explanations for this loss of interest 
are: 
(a) A clear clash between new theories like these and the main corpus of the received economic theory. Thus, managers' 
goals may not necessarily be the same as those of the owners. Such ownership-management duality may lead 
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self-interested managers to pursue activities that are in their own but not necessarily in the shareholders' best 
interest. This conflict is a potential cause of the short/long-term profitability problem. 
(b) These new approaches based upon alternative behavior hypotheses require the construction of multi-criteria utility 
functions (or proxy functions). These functions underlie all company management theories (e.g., [6]). For instance, 
non-profit or public organizations need to reflect their social interests. In this type of situation, firms tend to sacrifice 
monetary gains to progress in the social objective. 
These two types of problems have been studied at length in the last few years. The rise of what is known as behavioral 
economics, where all basic economic hypotheses are tested from a psychological perspective, has opened the doors to the 
formulation of alternative hypotheses (e.g., Refs. [7-9]). Second, important developments in the multiple criteria decision 
making paradigm (MCDM) offer powerful analytical frameworks to tackle the optimization of economic problems involving 
several conflictive criteria (e.g., Refs. [10-12]). 
This paper attempts to take a further step in this direction, that is, to formulate mathematical economic models based 
upon new behavioral hypotheses within a realistic MCDM framework. Moving in this direction, we propose a mathematical 
multiple criteria programming model valid for computing efficient strategies for large companies, inspired by the underlying 
theory of the behavioral economics school. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 defines the basic model inputs. In Section 3 a multi-objective programming 
model valid for computing feasible efficient strategies is presented. Section 4 discusses serious computational difficulties 
associated with this type of model. Consequently, the above model is transformed into an extended compromise program-
ming model. This model is very easy to compute, since it involves solving a fewer number of linear programming problems. 
The proposed theory is applied to the analysis and computation of the optimal financial strategy of a large Spanish company 
operating in the energy sector. The last section presents the main conclusions derived from this research and indicates pos-
sible lines for further research. 
2. Definition of model inputs 
2A. Parameters 
P 
A 
E 
e 
C 
F 
F 
R 
RIN 
RE 
G 
T 
i 
K2 
e 
shareholder funds (i.e. capital and reserves) 
accumulated depreciation 
long-term liabilities 
short-term liabilities 
share capital 
fixed assets 
gross fixed assets 
average internal rate of return over fixed assets 
net returns over fixed assets 
non-distributed reserves 
gross profits before taxes 
taxes over profits 
average cost of financing the long-term liabilities 
minimum acceptable level for the company's solvency (i.e. the value of the 
P\E ratio) 
minimum acceptable level for the book value of company's shares (i.e., the 
value of the PjC ratio) 
maximum average legal coefficient for the depreciation of the gross fixed 
assets 
minimum percentage of share capital to be distributed as dividend (i.e. the 
Baumol's profit constraint) 
2.2. Decision variables 
X2 
X3 
X4 
X5 
X6 
X 
annual increment of non-distributed reserves 
annual increment of share capital 
annual increment of accumulated depreciation 
annual increment of long-term liabilities 
annual increment of fixed assets 
annual distributed dividend 
(X1,X2,X3,X4,X5,X6) = vector of the decision variables 
3. A basic multi-objective model 
3.1. Criteria 
The following would appear to be sensible criteria in the context of the long-term strategic financial planning of a large 
company: 
1. Maximize company expansion measured by the annual increment of its permanent capital, leading to the following 
objective function: 
M a x / 1 ( X ) = X 1 + X 2 + X 3 + X 4 . (1) 
2. Maximize company solvency, leading to the following objective function: 
M a x / 2 ( X H P ± A ± ^ ± ^ . (2) 
3. Maximize the book values of company shares, leading to the following objective function: 
M a x ^ X H ^ + M * ^ . (3) 
L + A2 
4. Maximize the distributed dividends: 
Max/4(X)=X6 . (4) 
5. Maximize the leverage measured by the difference between the average internal rate of return of the fixed assets minus 
the costs of financing the long-term liabilities, leading to the following objective function: 
Max/5(X) =R{F + X5) -i(E + X4). (5) 
Constraint set. 
The following constraints must be met by any strategic financial plan: 
1. The company solvency ratio must be greater than a minimum bound Ki, leading to the following inequality: 
P+A+Xl+X2+X-i 
ETX4 > K i - ( 6 ) 
2. The book or accounting value of the shares of the company must be greater than a minimum bound K2, leading to the 
following inequality: 
P+A+Xi+X2+X3 
cTx2 ^ K>- (7) 
3. The internal rate of return of the fixed assets after taxes must surpass a bound RIN leading to the following inequality: 
( 1
 - ; ; G X 5 - X 3 ) >™. (8) 
4. According to Baumol's profit constraint hypothesis, the company must distribute a dividend at least equal to the ¡A per 
cent of the share capital, leading to the following inequality: 
X6 > p£. (9) 
5. The annual cost of depreciation must be less than or equal the maximum allowed by law, leading to the following 
inequality: 
X3 < 8F'. (10) 
6. For obvious reasons, the values of the decision variables cannot be negative, leading to the following set of inequalities: 
X > 0. (11) 
Accounting rows. 
1. The annual increment of fixed assets must be covered by the annual increase of non-distributed reserves, share capital 
and long-term liabilities, leading to the following identity: 
X 1 + X 2 + X 4 - X 5 = 0. (12) 
2. The gross profits of the company after taxes must be allocated to non-distributed reserves and dividends, leading to the 
following identity: 
( G - X 3 ) - r ( G - X 3 ) = X 1 + X 6 . 
This results in the following identity: 
x1+x6 + (i-r)x3 = (i-r)G. (13) 
The above criteria, constraints and accounting rows lead to the following multi-objective optimization problem: 
EFF[f1(X),/2(X),/3(X),/4(X),/5(X)], 
Subject to : 
Constraints (6)-(11), (14) 
Accounting rows (12)—(13), 
where EFF means the search for efficient maximizing solutions. Hence, solving the multi-objective programming model gi-
ven by (14) will output the feasible Pareto efficient set of financial strategies, that is, feasible financial strategies where no 
other feasible strategy can achieve equal or better performance for all objectives and strictly better for at least one objective 
(see, e.g., Ref. [13]). 
Even though model (14) is of moderate size, the number of extreme efficient solutions will be very large due to a rather 
large number of objective functions, resulting in an unmanageable amount of information (Ref. [14]). For this reason, only effi-
cient financial strategies that represent best compromise solutions from a financial perspective, will be elicited. This task will 
be undertaken in the next section by formulating and solving an extended (composite) compromise programming model. 
4. An extended compromise programming model 
In order to obtain a manageable number of feasible efficient financial strategies, the multi-objective programming model 
given by (14) is transformed into the following extended compromise programming model (for technical details, see 
[15,16]): 
Achievement function: 
MIN <ft = (1 - X)D + x ¿ wr~_f^, 
¡=1 J i ~J>* 
Subject to: (15) 
W¡<c~_P -D < 0 ¡e{ l , . . . ,5} , (16) 
Constraints (6)—(11), 
Accounting rows (12)—(13), 
where: 
Wt relative importance or preferential weight attached to the ¡th objective 
/> the ideal value for the ¿th objective, that is, the maximum value of this objective over the constraint set, without 
considering the achievement of the other objectives 
ft, the anti-ideal value for the ith objective, that is, the minimum value of this objective over the constraint set, 
without considering the achievement of the other objectives. 
D the maximum deviation or maximum degree of discrepancy 
X control parameter taking values within the closed interval [0,1]. 
When 1=1 , model (16) maximizes the average achievement of the five financial objectives considered (i.e. second term of 
achievement function in (16)). On the other hand, for 1 = 0, the model outputs the best compromise solution minimizing the 
degree of discrepancy or, equivalently, maximizing the degree of balance in the achievement of the objectives (i.e. first term 
of the achievement function in (16)). For other values of control parameter 1 belonging to the open interval (0,1), interme-
diate solutions, if they exist, can be obtained. Note that control parameter 1 plays the role of a "balancing factor" between 
"maximum average achievement" (1 = 1) and the "most balanced achievement" (1 = 0) in this context. In short, 1 trades off 
efficiency ("average achievement") against equity ("most balanced achievement"). Another interesting point is that the com-
putational burden associated with this task involves solving linear programming parametric models only (for technical de-
tails about these issues see [17,18]). 
In the next section, we will apply the proposed extended compromise programming model in order to compute the best 
compromise financial strategies of a large Spanish company operating in the energy sector. 
5. A case study 
The methodology proposed in Sections 3 and 4 will be used to analyse the behaviour of the Spanish firm Unión Fenosa for 
the financial year 2007, when the Spanish energy sector was being restructured. Unión Fenosa is a group of companies focus-
ing on the production and distribution of electrical energy and operating in several markets. Additionally, Unión Fenosa is 
one of the biggest Spanish companies. It is listed on the Madrid Stock Exchange and weighted in the Ibex-35 index. Ibex-
35 is the most selective index for financial Spanish markets. From the company's balance sheet for the 2007 financial year, 
we selected the following data: 
million euros 
Shareholder's funds (P) 4444 
Accumulated depreciation (A) 7583 
Long-term liabilities (E) 4087 
Share capital (C) 914 
Fixed assets (F) 14283 
Gross fixed assets (F') 19016 
Non-distributed reserves (RE) 3530 
Gross profits before taxes (G) 2060 
(Source: Ref. [19]) 
The following parameter values were considered throughout the exercise: 
Taxes on profits (I) = 0.30 
Average cost of financing long-term liabilities (¡) = 0.07 
Baumol's constraint (¡A) = 0.30 
Average internal rate of return (R) = 0.13 
Net return over fixed assets (RIN) = 0.06 
Maximum average legal coefficient for depreciation (0) = 0.05 
Regarding the minimum acceptable levels for ratios Ki (solvency) and K2 (share book value), the company should at least 
aspire to repeat the values achieved in the previous year (i.e. 2006). 
The pay-off matrix shown in Table 1 was straightforwardly obtained from the above data by separately optimizing the 
five objectives over the constraint set. The interpretation of the elements of this matrix is simple. Thus, the first element 
of the first row of the matrix represents the maximum value of /i(X) (i.e. the maximum feasible financial expansion of 
the company) subject to constraints (6)-(ll) . The other four elements of this first row represent the values of the other four 
objectives compatible with the maximization of objective/^X). The other rows of the pay-off matrix have a similar meaning. 
By construction the elements of the main diagonal of the pay-off matrix represent the ideal vector (i.e.,/,*,.. ./5*) and the min-
imum value of each column of the pay-off matrix represents the anti-ideal or worst value (i.e., /i» /5„). The pay-off matrix 
has been enlarged with an additional row that shows the observed values for the five objectives considered by Unión Fenosa 
in 2007 (i.e. the actual financial strategies followed by the company). Noteworthy is that, as ideal and anti-ideal values often 
belong to the same row, the pay-off matrix obtained shows in general a high level of conflict among the set objectives. This 
conflict is especially relevant between the maximum financial expansion (ft) and maximum dividend (f4) objectives, and is in 
line with the expectations of a traditional financial analysis. Finally, another interesting point is that the actual values for 
Unión Fenosa in the year 2007 basically lie within the ranges defined by the difference between the ideal and the anti-ideal 
value for each objective. 
From the above balance sheet data plus the ideal and anti-ideal values shown in the pay-off matrix, it is straightforward 
to implement the extended compromise programming model given by (16). The exercise was conducted by assuming that 
the company attaches the same importance to all five objectives (i.e. Wi = •• -W5). The best compromise financial strategies 
shown in Table 2 were output by varying the value of control parameter X. 
Table 1 
Pay-off matrix for the set five objectives considered. Bold characters denote ideal values and underlined figures anti-ideal values. 
Expansion (million euros) Solvency Book value Dividend (million euros) Leverage (million euros) 
1702 
1667 
1651 
1571 
1761 
1676 
Expansion (fi(X)) 
Solvency (f2(X)) 
Book value (f3(X)) 
Dividend (f4(X)) 
Leverage (f5(X)) 
Observed values 
2009 
1515 
1403 
0 
1693 
1619 
2.94 
3.31 
3.29 
2.94 
2.94 
2.93 
13.16 
13.16 
14.69 
13.16 
13.16 
14.28 
274 
274 
274 
1442 
274 
316 
Table 2 
Best compromise financial strategies for the set of five objectives. 
Control parameter 
X 
[0,0.04] 
(0.04,0.30] 
(0.30,0.33] 
(0.33,1] 
Expansion/i(X) 
euros 
816 
779 
1142 
1403 
million Solvency 
/2(X) 
3,09 
3.13 
3.22 
3.29 
Book value/3(X) 
13,78 
14.01 
14.41 
14.69 
Dividend 
euros 
748 
727 
542 
274 
« X ) million Leverage /5(X) million 
euros 
1.648 
1644 
1614 
1651 
According to the theory presented in Section 4 the interpretation of the four financial strategies shown in Table 2 is rather 
simple. Thus, the solution corresponding to the first row of Table 2 represents the "most balanced" solution for the five 
objectives considered. On the other hand, the solution corresponding to the last row of Table 2 represents the "maximum 
average" solution, again for the five objectives considered. Finally, the other two solutions represent possible compromises 
among the two previous solutions, that is, compromises between the "maximum average" and the "most balanced" 
strategies. 
Note also the close resemblance between the "maximum average" (last row of Table 2) and the financial structure actu-
ally followed by Unión Fenosa (see additional row of Table 1). In short, it is "as i f this company were looking for a best com-
promise strategy by additively maximizing the average achievement of the five objectives defined in the analysis 
undertaken. 
6. Conclusions and further research 
This paper has shown how a proper combination of behavioural economics with MCDM methods can revitalize classical 
financial analysis. In this way, multi-criteria mathematical programming models can play a crucial role in building bridges 
between theory and practice within the behavioural economics paradigm. 
Two possible extensions of this research are: 
(a) To investigate the possible influence of the preferential weights W¡ in the output financial strategies. In this sense, 
there are two possible directions. The first would be to implement a sensitivity analysis with the preferential weights 
in order to check the possible robustness of the solutions. The second would be to elicit the weight values compatible 
with the information provided by company managers through an interactive process with these managers. To do this, 
a "pairwise" comparison format of the criteria considered (e.g., [20]) would appear to be a promising option. Thus, 
assuming "judgment reciprocity", then the managers should answer 5(5 - l)/2 = 10 "pairwise" questions in our case. 
This would appear to be an acceptable interactive workload. 
(b) To treat the preferential weights as unknowns in order to elicit the vector of weights that can provide a better approx-
imation with respect to the actual behavior followed by the analyzed company (see [21]). 
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